Ian Kaplan and Mustafa Himmati
“While some countries have successfully negotiated the relationship between their local educational aims and practices with that of modern schooling, other countries have struggled to find this balance. The misalignment of the traditional educational systems and modern schooling, along with the dynamics of globalization, donor dependency, and local politics of power and identity, have made schooling a source of conflict. Afghanistan unfortunately—like many other fragile states—falls in the latter category”.1
Context
Two-and-a-half years after the Taliban takeover in August 2021, the structure and details of Afghanistan’s education system are still emerging. This offers an opportunity to critically evaluate the previous two decades of Western influence on Afghanistan’s education system through the lens of post-colonialism and neo-colonialism. We use ‘neo-colonialism’ to mean current systems and processes rooted in colonial ideas and practices but enacted in modern postcolonial forms.
To understand the scale of Western influence, we first look at financial aid. From late 2001 to August 2021 (between the Taliban’s two periods of control), Afghanistan’s education system was almost entirely financed by Western donor countries. Only an estimated 12% was funded by the Afghan government.2 The donor funding was accompanied by specific requirements regarding how the money should be spent. This meant that Western political and technical influence was fundamental in shaping Afghanistan’s education system.
Development and humanitarian intervention in Afghanistan
Before focusing on education, it is worth examining development and humanitarian interventions in Afghanistan more broadly. It is depressing, although not surprising, that more than 20 years of aid – and massive expenditure of human, financial, and material resources – has not had a more positive impact on Afghanistan and its people.
A neo-colonial narrative would suggest that any failure of impact rests with the Afghan government, its people and their inability, or unwillingness, to use the aid they have received in relevant and effective ways. However, this view fails to understand the problems countries face when trying to assimilate or integrate ideas and processes from other contexts. It also ignores the scope of neo-colonial Western influence on the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan during that period.
It therefore ignores donors’ complicity in governmental corruption and mismanagement. Finally, a neo-colonial narrative minimises donor countries’ own mismanagement and corruption of aid and the lack of transparency and accountability for their actions. This is particularly the case with the shallow transplantation of educational policies and processes that may be inappropriate to local context.
Western engagement with Afghanistan was (and remains) complex and multifaceted, with a mixture of positive and negative outcomes. However, we argue that the ways in which Western aid was planned and delivered are based on systems and processes with deep colonial roots. They include:
- a lack of respect for indigenous forms of thinking, working and governance;
- a lack of meaningful, inclusive and participatory engagement with Afghan communities;
donor-driven interventions which often lacked local relevance and contextualization; - a lack of continuity of funding, programmes and people (e.g., the regular turnover of donor representatives and NGO workers hindered the building of trust and sustainability);
- interventions – projects and programmes – linked to short-term donor funding and political cycles;
- conflicting or competing interests and agendas (between donors, multilateral organisations and different Afghan government and civil society actors);
- an emphasis on quantity over quality and form over function in the way that aid was planned, delivered and measured.
Neo-colonial impact on education
The issues noted previously all negatively impacted the quality and relevance of education in Afghanistan, creating space for corruption and often disempowering local communities. Of course, these consequences were not intended by donors. But one of the more dangerous aspects of neo-colonialism is a profound lack of reflection. In this sense neo-colonialism works through a set of attitudes and structures that are often taken for granted as being universal, neutral, or harmless – regardless of intention.
Here is a specific example of how this works. Local/regional Islamic forms of education, such as madrassas and Darul Uloomm, pre-date Western forms of education in Afghanistan. They are widely understood and accepted in Afghan communities. However, during the 20-year period we are looking at, there was very little attempt by Western donors to open-mindedly engage with these forms of Islamic education.
Islamic education in Afghanistan was typically seen as, at best, promoting poor quality rote-learning of an exclusively religious curriculum. At worst, it was seen as a system designed to indoctrinate students in ‘jihadist’ terrorism. This bias was largely based on assumptions and resulted in potential education opportunities being missed.
As with secular schools, Islamic education institutions, such as madrassas, vary in terms of quality, curriculum (which can include secular subjects) and pedagogy. They can be welcoming, positive spaces for the education of boys and girls.
A critical reflection on this 20-year period of heightened Western influence on Afghanistan’s education system does not mean the Taliban’s approach to education should be romanticised either. Exclusion, violence, and oppression are not exclusive to colonialism, nor limited to ‘Western’ nation-states or cultures.
Looking ahead
What we see in Afghanistan today is a hunger for quality education for boys and girls from local communities across the country. There are opportunities for such education through both secular and Islamic forms of education, based on genuine collaboration and sustained engagement with Afghan communities.
Currently opportunities for girls’ education in Afghanistan remain limited due to ongoing restrictions and a lack of clarity on how the Taliban education system will address issues of education access and quality more generally. This reflects poorly on their governance. These issues need to be addressed with greater urgency, to limit any further damage to a country that has suffered so much for so many years.
[1] https://bit.ly/eer24-5
[2] https://bit.ly/eer24-17
Ian is a senior education and research specialist with the Norwegian Afghanistan Committee (NAC) and an EENET co-director. He can be contacted at: ian.kaplan@nacaf.org
Mustafa is the head of knowledge management with the Norwegian Afghanistan Committee (NAC). He can be contacted at: mustafa.himmati@nacaf.org